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African Development: Beyond Income Convergence 
Abstract
In  examining  some  big  questions  on  African  development,  we  provide  evidence  that 
dynamics of some development indicators could support both endogenous and neoclassical growth 
theories in the convergence debate. This paper investigates convergence in real per capita GDP and 
inequality adjusted human development in African countries, disaggregated into 11 homogenous 
panels based on regions(Sub-Saharan and North Africa), income-levels(low, middle, lower-middle 
and  upper-middle),  legal-origins(English  common-law  and  French  civil-law)  and  religious 
dominations(Christianity  and  Islam).  Findings  reveal,  while  human  development  supports  the 
exogenous growth model and rejects the endogenous theory, its income component suggests the 
contrary.  As a policy implication,  looking beyond income convergence can provide a concrete 
agenda for development involving all aspects of economic, institutional and social life. Also, the 
income component of the human development index moves slower than others in the convergence 
process and thus requires a more focused policy intervention.
JEL Classification: Human development; Growth; Convergence; Panel; Africa
Keywords:  O11; O20; O47; O55; P52
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1.  Introduction
Is human development among African countries converging or diverging? Do income levels 
matter in poor countries catching-up with their rich counterparts? Does religious-origin have some 
bearing  on  convergence(divergence)  in  African  development?  Does  legal-origin  influence  the 
quality  of  human  development  convergence?  Do regional  dynamics  matter  in  the  convergence 
process?  Common  to  all  these  questions  are  the  issues  of  the  speed  of  and  time  for 
convergence(divergence). These concerns cut deep into the formulation of theories and policies of 
economic growth in the African continent. By 2008, according to Konya & Guisan(2008;9) only 
three papers in the literature had focused on the study of convergence by measuring standards of 
living with the human development index instead of per capita GDP  or labour productivity. What 
many  studies  show  is  that  economic  and  human  developments  are  complex  processes  with 
historical,  political,  economic,  geographic and institutional determinants that do not conform to 
some  simple  linear  model(Mayer-Foulkes,2010).  This  fact  guides  the  current  paper  in 
disaggregating African countries into 11 homogenous panels based on regions(Sub-Saharan and 
North Africa), income-levels(low, middle, lower-middle and upper-middle), legal-origins(English 
common-law and French civil-law) and religious dominations(Christianity and Islam). The 
richness of our dataset in investigating this previously missing human development dimension in 
the convergence literature adds impetus to the study.
Convergence in economic growth and per capita income among nations has  been a central 
theme  in  neoclassical  growth  theory  and  a  great  bulk  of  economic  literature  for  decades. 
Traditionally, the analysis of convergence involved the investigation of whether poor countries are 
set on a convergence path; that is, if their real per capita incomes will eventually catch up with 
those  of  rich  countries.  However  in  recent  decades,  increased  emphasis  has  been  laid  on 
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development strategies based on regional economic integration which has required effectiveness 
and stability,   strengthening of macroeconomic policy credibility;  leading to the formulation of 
specific goals of macroeconomic convergence among regional economic groupings(Tirelli,2010; 
Kumo,2011).
Empirical  evidence  shows  that  during  the  past  three  decades  there  has  been  strong 
differences  among  countries  in  real  capita  income  and  economic  growth,  especially  between 
African economies and emerging Asian countries(Kumo,2011). Introducing a previously missing 
human  development  component  into  the  convergence  debate  with  an  in  depth  analysis  from 
multidimensional  spectrums could result  in  important  policy implications.  This  paper  therefore 
assesses three aspects of intra-regional convergence in eleven different panels from the African 
continent.  These include:  firstly,  the assessment  of convergence(divergence)  among economies; 
secondly,  the  speed  of  convergence  and   thirdly,   the  time  needed  to  achieved  full(100%) 
convergence.  An  added  appeal  of  this  work  is  the  use  of  a  new  approach  to  convergence 
investigation  recently  applied  by  Narayan  et  al.(2011).  Grasping the  rate  of  and time  for  full 
convergence  could  have  particularly  significant  policies  implications  for  the  African  continent 
given  the  current  debate  on  economic  integration.  The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  in  the 
following manner. Section 2 reviews existing literature. Data and methodology are presented and 
outlined respectively in Section 3.  Empirical analysis, discussion of results, policy implications 
and future directions are covered in Section 4. We conclude with Section 5. 
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2. Literature review 
2.1  Theoretical framework 
The initial theories of growth that sprouted with the Neoclassical revolution and the demise 
of Keynesianism defined the concept of convergence. As Development Economics was thrown out, 
together with its appreciation of vicious and virtuous circles, nascent theories of economic growth 
grounded simply on extending the concepts of market equilibrium to the intertemporal dynamic 
context  forecasted  absolute  convergence(Mayer-Foulkes,  2010).  It  ensued  that  economic 
convergence across countries  would result  from the implementation  of free markets.  Therefore 
findings on convergence  were considered to support free market policies.  Results from initial  
empirical  studies on income convergence(Barro,  1991) revealed absolute divergence instead,  as 
was  later confirmed for the long-run by Pritchett(1997).
The neoclassical(exogenous) growth model predicts that real per capita income converges 
to each country’s steady state or common steady state, irrespective of it initial level(Kumo, 2011). 
Conversely, the endogenous growth theory by emphasizing differences among countries in their 
initial endowments and the possibility of multiple equilibria shows that there is no tendency for 
income levels to converge in the long-term. 
2.2 Previous studies on convergence in human development
More  than  two  decades  have  passed  since  the  1990  Human  Development  Report  that 
introduced economic development as human development. Twenty years of change have followed, 
marked  by globalization  and events  that  have improved our  understanding of  the  convergence 
dimension in human development(Mayer-Foulkes, 2010). 
In 2008, Konya & Guisan(2008;9) acknowledged the existence of only three papers in the 
literature that were dedicated to the study of convergence by measuring living standards. These 
5
were  Mazumdar(2002),  Sutcliffe(2004)  and  Noorbakhsh(2006).  Since  the  work  of  Konya  & 
Guisan(2008),  to  the  best  of  our  knowledge only two works  have  been added to this  bulk of 
existing  human  development  convergence  literature:  Mayer-Foulkes(2010)  and  Clark(2011). 
However,  in retrospect  we notice  that  Konya & Guisan(2008) do not  give credit  to  Hobijn & 
Franses(2001) and Neumayer (2003)  who have also focused on human development convergence. 
We shall examine all these works in the review below.
Mazumdar(2002)  investigate  if  the  Human  Development  Index(HDI)  converged  across 
countries over the period 1960-1995 for a full sample of 91 countries, as well as for three groups of 
countries  classified  in  their  levels  of  human  development.  Findings  of  this  work  indicated 
divergence  for  all  four  considered  cases,  suggesting  that  the  economies  of  the  world  were 
becoming  more  dissimilar  over  the  period  1960-1995  with  respect  to  the  HDI.  Konya  & 
Guisan(2008) have criticized  the basis  for data  comparability in  the work.  According to  them, 
Mazumdar(2002) obtained the HDI values for 1960 and 1995 from the 1998 issue of the Human 
Development  Report(HDR).  The 1998 HDR however  does  not  report  any HDI data  for  1960. 
Konya & Guisan(2008) further emphasis it is well stated on the UNDP website that “ comparable  
data are not available for many countries for all components of the HDI before 1975, so 1975 is the 
first year for which the HDI was calculated”(page. 27).
Sutcliffe(2004) focused on the link between globalization and world inequality and only 
assessed  the  issue  of  convergence  in  human  development  by  studying  the  HDI  trends  of  99 
countries  in  1975,  1980,….,1995  and  2001.  Still  borrowing  from  Konya  &  Guisan(2008), 
Sutcliffe(2004) rebuffed the whole idea of HDI convergence for two reasons. (1) He posited that 
developed countries have their HDIs close to unity because in these countries life expectancy has 
been close to its biological limit,  adult  literacy and educational(primary)   enrolment have been 
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practically hundred percent, and the impact of the only variable without natural upper limit(per 
capita income) on measuring the variation between the rich and the poor is strongly restricted by 
taking the logarithm of per capita  income.  According to  Konya & Guisan(2008),  this  is  not a 
reasonable criticism because in the HDI, life expectancy and education are measured in relative 
terms compared to the variation between potentially ever changing maximum and minimum values. 
As concerns per capita income, the logarithm transformation certainly brings the values closer to 
each other and this is true for the extreme values too. (2) Sutcliffe(2004) is of the opinion that the 
HDI  convergence  has  been  grasped  suddenly  by  the  IMF(for  instance)  to  mitigate  the 
acknowledged downside of the long-term economic history of the world economy.  We concur 
with Konya  & Guisan(2008) in  asserting  that  this  second point  might  be true,  but  it  does not 
eradicate the fact that even with the exception of  income, health and education(other components 
in the HDI) are  crucial determinants of the quality of life. 
 Noorbakhsh’s(2006) used slightly updated data on the HDI from 1975 to 2002 with five 
year  intervals.  However  his  methodology  has  been  criticized  from  a  broad  range  of 
dimensions(Konya & Guisan,2008; pp.28-29). A common criticism to Mazumdar (2002), Sutcliffe 
(2004)  and  Noorbakhsh  (2006),  is  that  they  tested  for  convergence  without  correcting  for 
heteroscedasticity. Owing to the wide range of countries in their samples, it’s most likely that their 
estimates could be misleading. 
Neumayer (2003) and Hobijn & Franses(2001) investigate convergence in living standards. 
While the later conclude on the existence of divergence in living standards, the former argues that 
convergence  in  living  standards  should  not  be  looked-at  only  in  some  achievement  index. 
Neumayer(2003) finds strong evidence of convergence in some aspects of living standards like life-
expectancy,  infant  survival,  educational  enrolment,  literacy as  well  as telephone and television 
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availability.  Neumayer(2003)  argues  that  in  suggesting  divergence  rather  than  convergence  in 
living  standards,  Hobijn  &  Franses(2001)  unduly  deny  one  of  the  great  success  stories  of 
development  in  the  last  century.  Clark(2011)  study  the  last  half  of  the  twentieth  century  by 
examining the extent to which welfare outcomes have actually converged and the degree by which 
economic  development  is  responsible  for  the  observed trends.  Drawing from estimates  of  195 
nations during the period 1955 to 2005, he finds that life expectancy averages converged during 
this  time but the infant  mortality rate continuously diverged. Among poor countries,  economic 
development improves life expectancy more than it reduces infant mortality while the situation is 
reversed  among  wealthier  nations.  In  this  perspective,  development  has  contributed  to  both 
convergence in life expectancy and divergence in infant mortality. There is also evidence that the 
positive effect of GDP per capita on life expectancy attenuates at higher levels of development 
whereas the negative effect of GDP per capita growth on infant mortality grows stronger.
2.3  Motivations for convergence in African development
Weak  development  convergence  hinders  deeper  economic  integration  in  African  sub-
regions. Thus human development convergence is not an end in itself; instead it is a strategy to 
economic integration. In the same line of march, convergence to similar per capita income and 
human  development  levels  could  facilitate  trade  links  and  technological  spillovers,  equalize 
macroeconomic and institutional policies. On the other hand, macroeconomic strategies should be 
designed conditional on the actual degree of convergence in the economic structure(Tirelli, 2010). 
Analysis  of human development convergence therefore serves as a signal in the degree of success 
of integration promotion strategy(Kumo, 2011). 
In  contrast  to   Tirelli(2010)  and  Kumo(2011),  we postulate  that  studies  on  integration 
should  not  limit  the  concept  of  convergence  to  the  neoclassical  versus  endogenous  growth 
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controversy in the development of African countries. As highlighted by Konya & Guisan (2008), 
for underdeveloped countries, beyond macro economic convergence, factor endowments, policies 
and  institutions,  other  important  dimensions  of  human-life  like,  health,  education,  working 
conditions, leisure time, environment, management to escape the grip of famine, social justice…etc 
have become increasingly important. Lofty ambitions of catching-up with the First World cannot 
only be limited to analysis between developed and developing countries. A within-assessment of 
African convergence could be modeled to take stock of the state and direction of living standards. 
This  dimension  of  convergence  has  escaped the  focus  of  development  literature  and certainly 
deserves attention. Neoclassical growth theory  has modeled  income-convergence in such a neat 
way. Given the absence of strong theoretical foundation for human development convergence, we 
agree  with  Costantini  &  Lupi(2005)  that  applied  econometrics  has  other  tasks  than  merely 
validating or refuting economic theories. 
2.4 How does the current paper integrate various strands in the literature? 
Firstly, we  have concurred with Konya & Guisan(2008) in the postulation that a  common 
criticism to  Mazumdar (2002),  Sutcliffe  (2004) and Noorbakhsh (2006),  is  that  they tested for 
convergence without correcting for heteroscedasticity and owing to the wide range of countries in 
their samples, it’s most likely that their estimates could be misleading. This concern is taken into 
account in our paper by the Two-Step dynamic GMM estimation technique. It should be recalled 
that the  first-step is based on homoscedasticity of residuals.
Secondly, the Sutcliffe(2004) criticism of the HDI convergence as a means by the IMF to 
blur the long standing differences between rich and poor countries is only partially valid. We have 
sided with Konya & Guisan(2008) in asserting that this second point might be true, but it does not 
eradicate  the  fact  that  even  with  the  exception  of   income,  health  and  education  are   crucial 
9
determinants of the quality of life. To account for this dimension of the debate, we shall distinguish 
the income component of the HDI in a distinct analysis. Therefore our variables of interest shall be 
GDP per capita and human development. More so, this decomposition is in line with the basis for 
the Hobijn & Franses(2001) and Neumayer(2003) debate.
Thirdly,  the 2010 Human Development Report has integrated some of the criticisms by 
Sutcliffe(2004) into the new HDI computation: inequality adjusted HDI. Therefore our work steers 
clear of past literature by using an index that integrates criticisms from said literature. 
            Fourthly, the absence of any study that has focused exclusively on  Africa is deserving of  
examination.  In  the  present  context  of  the  regional  integration  debate  in  the  continent,  it  is 
worthwhile  investigating  the  human  development  appeals  of  such  policies.  Beyond  this,  the 
richness of our dataset(based on 11 homogenous panels)  adds motivation to context of this paper.
3. Data and methodology
3.1 Data
We examine  a  sample  of  38  African  countries  with   data  from  African  Development 
Indicators(ADI) of the World Bank. Due to constraints in data availability, dataset spans from 1981 
to 2009.  Details  on summary statistics(Appendix 1),  correlation  analysis(Appendix  2),  variable 
definitions(Appendix 3) and presentation of countries(Appendix 4) are revealed in the appendices. 
Many studies show that economic and human developments are complex processes with 
historical, political, economic, institutional and geographical determinants that do not conform to 
some simple linear model(Mayer-Foulkes,2010). To this end, we concur with Narayan et al.(2011) 
in  highlighting  that  one  is  unlikely  to  find  convergence  of  stock  markets  within  a  very 
heterogeneous set of countries. We therefore disaggregate countries into homogenous panels based 
on income-levels(low-income,  middle-income,  lower middle-income and upper middle-income), 
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regions(SSA and North  Africa),  legal-origins(English  common-law and French civil-law)   and 
religious-dominations(Christianity and Islam). The choice of these panels is merely an extension of 
Narayan et al.(2011). In the literature on convergence in per capita incomes, countries identical in 
structural  characteristics  such  as  preferences  in  technologies,  rate  of  population  growth, 
government policies and price stability have the tendency to converge to one another if their initial 
conditions are dissimilar(Prichett,  1997). In this  paper we proxy for preferences in technology,  
population growth, government policy and price stability with openness(trade), population growth 
rate, public investment and inflation respectively(Bruno et al.,2011; Narayan et al., 2011).
3.2  Model and estimation approach 
Borrowing from  Fung(2009) the two equations below are the standard approaches in the 
literature for testing conditional convergence if  tiW ,  is taken as strictly exogenous. 
titititititi WYYY ,,,,, )ln()ln()ln( εξηδβ τττ ++++=− −−−       (1)
tititititi WYY ,,,, )ln()ln( εξηδσ ττ ++++= −−                       (2)
 Where σ = 1+ β,  tiY ,  is the measure of per capita income or human development in country i at 
period t.  tiW ,  is a vector of determinants of per capita human development,  iη  is a country specific 
effect,  tξ  is a time specific constant and  ti ,ε  an error term. Consistent with the neo-classical 
growth model, a statistically significant negative coefficient on β  in Eq. (1) suggests that countries 
relatively close to their steady state of per capita growth will experience a slowdown in growth of 
per capita human development, known as conditional convergence(Narayan et al.,2011; 2).  Also, 
in line with Fung(2009; 3), if  10 << σ in Eq.(2) , then  tiY ,  is dynamically stable around the  path 
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with a trend growth rate the same as that of  tW , and with a height relative to the level of tW .  The 
variables contained in  τ−tiW ,  and the individual effect  iη  are proxies for the long-term level the 
market is converging to. Thus, the country specific effect  iη  appreciates the existence of other 
determinants of a country’s steady state not captured by τ−tiW , .
Conditions  for  convergence  elucidated  above  are  valid  if  tiW ,  is  strictly  exogenous. 
Unfortunately,  this  is  not  the  case  in  the  real  world  because,  while  inflation,  trade,  public 
investment  and  population  growth(components  of  tiW , )  influence  per  capita  development,  the 
reverse effect cannot be ruled-out. Thus we are confronted with the issue of endogeneity  where 
inflation, openness(trade), public investment and population growth are correlated with the error 
term( ti ,ε ). Also country and time specific effects could be correlated with other variables in the 
model, which is often the case when lagged dependent variables apply to the equations.  A way of 
dealing with the problem of the correlation between the individual specific-effect and the lagged 
dependent variables consists in eliminating the individual effect by first differencing. Thus Eq. (2) 
becomes:
)()()ln()ln()ln( ,,2,,2,,,, ττττττ εεδσ −−−−−− −+−+−=− titititititititi WWYYYY                  (3)
However,  Ordinary  Least  Square(OLS)  estimators  are  still  biased  because  there  still 
remains  a correlation between the lagged endogenous independent variable  and the disturbance 
term.  Arellano  &  Bond(1991)  proposed  an  application  of  the  Generalized  Method  of 
Moments(GMM)  exploiting  all  the  orthogonality  conditions  between  the  dependent  lagged 
variables  and  the  error  term.  This  GMM approach  has  been  widely  used  in  the  convergence 
literature;  and recently applied by Narayan et  al.(2011). While Narayan et al.(2011) use Eq.(1) 
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without the presence of fixed effects, this paper  applies Eq.(3) instead: in line with Fung(2009). 
We apply the second-step GMM because it corrects the residuals for heteroscedasticity: contrary to 
Mazumdar  (2002),  Sutcliffe  (2004)  and  Noorbakhsh  (2006)  in  the  human  development-
convergence  literature.   The  first-step  supposes  that  the  residuals  are  homoscedastic.  The 
assumption of no auto-correlation in residuals is paramount as past lagged variables are to be used 
as instruments for the endogenous variables. However the estimation depends on the assumption 
that  the  lagged  values  of  the  dependent  variable  and  other  independent  variables  are  valid 
instruments in the regression. We expect the first-order auto-correlation of the differenced residuals 
to be significant while their second-order auto-correlation in levels should not. The validity of the 
instruments is also tested with the Sargan over-identifying restrictions  test(OIR). 
As emphasized by Islam (1995;14),  yearly time spans are too short to be appropriate for 
studying convergence, as short run disturbances may loom large in such brief time spans. Thus 
considering the data span of 28 years, we borrow from Narayan et al.(2011) in using a 4 year non-
overlapping interval such that we have seven time intervals: 1982-1985; 1986-1989 and so on. This 
implies in our regression, τ is set to 4.
We also compute the implied rate of convergence by calculating (σ/4) which is same as the 
Narayan et  al.(2011) computation of  (1+β)/4.  Thus we divide the estimated coefficient  of the 
lagged-log endogenous  difference  variable  by 4 because  we have  used a  four  year  interval  to 
mitigate short term disturbances. When the absolute value of the estimated lagged coefficient is 
greater than zero but less than one( 10 << σ ),  we conclude the existence of convergence.  The 
broader  interpretation  suggests,  past  differences  have  a  less  proportionate  impact  on  future 
differences, implying the variation on the left hand side of Eq.(3) is decreasing overtime as the 
country is converging to a steady state. 
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4. Empirical analysis
This section  investigates three main issues: (1) assessment of the presence of convergence;  
(2)  determination  of  the speed of  convergence  and;  (3)  computation  of  the  time needed for  a 
full(100%)convergence. Table 1 presents a summary of overall findings(which look at the first two 
issues), while Table 2 and Table 3 respectively present results for unconditional and conditional  
convergence. 
Unconditional(absolute) convergence is estimated when only the lagged difference of the 
endogenous variable is used as  the exogenous variable while conditional convergence is in respect 
of  Eq.  (3).  Therefore   unconditional  convergence  is  estimated  without  tiW ,  :vector  of 
determinants(openness,  inflation  public  investment  and  population  growth)  of  per  capita 
growth(human  development).  To assess  the  validity  of  the  model  and indeed the  convergence 
hypothesis, we carry-out two tests, notably the Sargan test, which examines the over-identification 
restrictions, and the Arrellano and Bond test for autocorrelation which assesses the null hypothesis 
of no autocorrelation. The Sargan test assesses whether the instruments are uncorrelated with the 
error term in the estimated equation. The null hypothesis is the view that the instruments as a group 
are  strictly exogenous(absence of endogeneity), which is essential for the validity of the GMM 
estimates.  We  also  report  the  Wald  statistics  for  the  combined  significance  of  estimated 
coefficients. The autocorrelation, Wald and Sargan tests statistics with associated p-values for each 
of the panels are reported in the tables. The Sargan test statistics often appear with a p-value greater 
than 0.10, hence its alternative hypothesis is rejected for the most part. We only report the second-
order autocorrelation:AR(2) test because it is more relevant than AR(1) as it detects autocorrelation 
in levels. For most estimated models we fail  to reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation.  
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There is therefore robust evidence that most of the models are free from autocorrelation at least at 
the 5% significance level. 
4.1 Synthesis of results 
Table 1  below presents, a summary of the results. This synthesis of results  is based on 
details presented in Tables 2-3. AC, CC, SAC, SCC; denote Absolute Convergence, Conditional 
Convergence,  Speed  of  Absolute  Convergence  and  Speed  of  Conditional  Convergence 
respectively. In contrast to GDP per capita growth, we notice substantial evidence of convergence 
in Human Development. 
Table 1: Summary of results on convergence 
GDP per capita growth Human Development 
 AC CC SAC SCC  AC CC SAC SCC 
Legal origins English Common Law No No --- --- Yes(5%) Yes(5%) 7.45% 13.92%
French Civil Law No Yes(10%) --- 5.75% No Yes(1%) --- 19.77%
Religions Christianity No No --- --- Yes(1%) Yes(1%) 11.75% 16.17%
Islam No No --- --- No Yes(10%) --- 23.70%
Regions North Africa No No --- --- Yes(1%) No 22.15% ---
Sub Saharan Africa No No --- --- Yes(1%) Yes(1%) 20.22% 17.12%
Income 
Levels 
Low Income Yes(5%) No 7.0% --- Yes(1%) Yes(1%) 22.40% 20.42%
Middle Income No No --- --- Yes(1%) Yes(1%) 20.60% 12.50%
Lower Middle Income No No --- --- Yes(1%) No 22.50% ---
Upper Middle Income No No --- --- Yes(1%) Yes(10%) 17.50% 8.82%
Africa No No --- --- Yes(1%) Yes(1%) 20.75% 15.00%
AC: Absolute Convergence. CC: Conditional Convergence. SAC : Speed of Absolute Convergence. SCC: Speed of Conditional Convergence. 
4.2 Results of absolute convergence(AC)
In Table 2 below, we  report results of absolute convergence. Firstly, we notice that for all 
models the instruments are valid as the alternative hypotheses of the AR(2) and Sargan OIR tests 
are rejected. In all cases where the lagged endogenous estimated coefficient is significant, the Wald 
statistics is also significant: which is not unexpected as only one explaining variable is used for the 
absolute convergence regressions. We find evidence of AC only in low income countries with a 
convergence rate of 7% per annum(p.a) and the time required for a 100% convergence of 57.14 
years(yrs).  Of all panels in the case of human development, only  French civil-law and Islam-
oriented countries fail the AC test. For the remaining panels, the following are their convergence 
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rates  and time  required  for  100% convergence:  English  common-law(7.45% p.a  for  53.69yrs); 
Christian(11.75% p.a for 30.04yrs); North Africa(22.15% p.a for 18.05yrs); SSA(20.22% p.a for 
19.78yrs);  Low  income  (22.40% p.a  for  17.85yrs);  Middle  income(20.60%  p.a  for  19.41yrs); 
Lower middle income(22.50% p.a for 17.77yrs); Upper middle income(17.50% p.a for 22.85 yrs ) 
and Africa(20.75% p.a for 19.27yrs).
Table 2:  Absolute convergence in development 
GDP per Capita Growth 
English French Christ Islam N.Africa SSAfrica Low.I Middle I LMI UMI Africa
Initial -0.005 -0.190 0.010 -0.177 -0.537 -0.086 -0.28** -0.103 -0.008 0.224 -0.088
(0.984) (0.249) (0.860) (0.633) (0.293) (0.708) (0.011) (0.866) (0.991) (0.696) (0.686)
2nd Auto -0.099 -1.560 -1.002 -1.078 -1.103 -1.221 -1.544 -0.535 -0.220 -0.922 -1.450
(0.920) (0.118) (0.315) (0.280) (0.269) (0.222) (0.122) (0.592) (0.825) (0.356) (0.146)
OIR 11.729 13.950 15.524 9.039 1.944 20.392 14.201 10.418 6.116 3.795 19.517
(0.925) (0.833) (0.745) (0.982) (0.999) (0.433) (0.820) (0.959) (0.998) (0.924) (0.488)
Wald 0.000 1.324 0.030 0.227 1.101 0.139 6.363** 0.028 0.0001 0.152 0.162
(0.984) (0.249) (0.860) (0.633) (0.293) (0.708) (0.011) (0.866) (0.991) (0.696) (0.686)
Countries 13 15 18 10 4 24 15 13 9 4 28
Obser 42 41 49 34 16 67 38 45 33 12 83
Human Development
English French Christ Islam N.Africa SSAfrica Low.I Middle I LMI UMI Africa
Initial 0.298** 1.079*** 0.470*** 1.049*** 0.886*** 0.809*** 0.896*** 0.824*** 0.90*** 0.70*** 0.83***
(0.015) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
2nd Auto -0.898 -0.224 -0.932 1.008 -1.343 -1.095 -1.103 -1.857* -1.697* -1.002 -1.120
(0.368) (0.822) (0.351) (0.313) (0.179) (0.273) (0.269) (0.063) (0.089) (0.316) (0.262)
OIR 13.518 22.395 22.142 12.514 4.764 28.272 21.726 14.677 8.973 4.947 29.26*
(0.854) (0.319) (0.332) (0.897) (0.999) (0.103) (0.355) (0.794) (0.983) (0.997) (0.082)
Wald 5.858** 386.03*** 6.642** 429.9*** 321.9*** 24.78*** 41.73*** 131.1*** 109.9*** 11.8*** 34.4***
(0.015) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Countries 14 23 24 13 5 32 22 15 10 5 37
Obser 82 138 142 78 30 190 132 88 60 28 220
***,**,*: significance levels of 1%,  5% and 10% respectively. English: Common-Law. French: Civil-Law. Christ: Christians. N.Africa: North 
Africa. SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa. Low I: Low Income. Middle I: Middle Income. LMI: Lower Middle Income. UMI: Upper Middle Income. 2 nd 
Auto: Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying Restrictions test. Obser: Observations. Wald: Statistics for joint significance of  
estimated coefficients. 
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4.3 Results of conditional convergence(CC) 
Findings for conditional convergence are reported in Table 3. 
Table 3: Conditional convergence in development 
GDP per Capita Growth
English French Christ Islam N.Africa SSAfrica Low.I Middle I LMI UMI Africa
Initial -0.076 -0.230* -0.025 -0.078 -1.200* -0.064 -0.257 -0.113 0.067 1.115 -0.189
(0.876) (0.071) (0.959) (0.810) (0.097) (0.773) (0.162) (0.794) (0.946) (0.490) (0.181)
Intercept -0.082 0.105 -0.252 0.240 0.618 -0.026 0.093 -0.051 0.617 -0.018 -0.028
(0.729) (0.573) (0.451) (0.370) (0.250) (0.892) (0.748) (0.889) (0.534) (0.983) (0.885)
Trade 0.015 0.018** 0.025 0.011 0.0008 0.017 0.010 0.019 0.021 -0.002 0.012
(0.215) (0.010) (0.306) (0.527) (0.973) (0.253) (0.358) (0.504) (0.251) (0.905) (0.213)
Inflation -0.009 -0.004 -0.013 0.010 0.027 -0.003 -0.010 -0.010 -0.005 --- -0.004
(0.220) (0.815) (0.226) (0.521) (0.605) (0.453) (0.429) (0.475) (0.703) (0.510)
PubIvt -0.028 0.083 -0.046 0.123 --- 0.025** -0.020 0.058 -0.015 --- -0.0005
(0.793) (0.216) (0.691) (0.333) (0.036) (0.788) (0.556) (0.875) (0.994)
Popg 0.121 -0.149 -0.105 -0.178 --- 0.075 -0.145 0.350 1.683 --- 0.135
(0.783) (0.734) (0.714) (0.809) (0.789) (0.534) (0.603) (0.410) (0.523)
2nd Auto -0.489 -1.388 -0.605 -1.037 -0.903 -1.101 -1.170 -1.079 -0.176 -1.113 -1.721*
(0.624) (0.165) (0.545) (0.299) (0.366) (0.270) (0.241) (0.280) (0.859) (0.265) (0.085)
OIR 5.311 5.504 13.213 6.004 0.000 16.279 9.180 8.422 2.271 2.091 24.43
(0.999) (0.999) (0.868) (0.996) (1.000) (0.699) (0.980) (0.988) (1.000) (0.989) (0.223)
Wald 4.887 12.170** 10.889* 3.806 4.659 10.778* 13.79** 6.393 5.285 0.666 7.782
(0.429) (0.032) (0.053) (0.577) (0.198) (0.055) (0.017) (0.269) (0.382) (0.716) (0.168)
Countries 12 14 17 9 4 22 14 12 8 4 26
Obser 39 35 48 26 16 59 35 39 27 12 74
Human Development
English French Christ Islam N.Africa SSAfrica Low.I Middle I LMI UMI Africa
Initial 0.557** 0.791*** 0.647*** 0.948* 0.284 0.685*** 0.817*** 0.50*** 0.786 0.353* 0.60***
(0.040) (0.000) (0.000) (0.057) (0.431) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.156) (0.092) (0.000)
Intercept 0.003 0.013* 0.007*** 0.009 0.026 0.012*** 0.011** 0.016*** 0.009 0.015** 0.01***
(0.603) (0.064) (0.007) (0.697) (0.116) (0.003) (0.025) (0.000) (0.554) (0.041) (0.001)
Trade -0.000 0.0008 0.0002 0.000 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 -0.000 -0.0002 0.0002* 0.0003
(0.850) (0.100) (0.541) (0.918) (0.364) (0.586) (0.706) (0.944) (0.595) (0.090) (0.443)
Inflation -0.0003 -0.000 -0.00*** 0.0003 -0.0001 -0.00*** -0.00*** 0.0002** 0.0003 --- -0.00***
(0.476) (0.002) (0.000) (0.121) (0.845) (0.000) (0.000) (0.023) (0.415) (0.000)
PubIvt -0.0001 0.003* 0.002 0.003 --- 0.0006 0.001 0.001** 0.003** --- 0.001
(0.970) (0.072) (0.208) (0.262) (0.495) (0.664) (0.035) (0.031) (0.293)
Popg 0.004 0.025*** 0.021*** 0.031 --- 0.021*** 0.024*** 0.013 0.021 --- 0.021***
(0.855) (0.000) (0.000) (0.311) (0.000) (0.000) (0.171) (0.202) (0.000)
2nd Auto -1.182 0.208 -1.412 0.676 -0.687 -0.788 -0.900 -1.332 -1.350 -1.054 -0.955
(0.236) (0.834) (0.157) (0.498) (0.491) (0.430) (0.367) (0.182) (0.177) (0.291) (0.339)
OIR 10.216 20.108 19.572 9.403 0.909 23.615 17.793 7.373 3.765 1.720 23.631
(0.964) (0.451) (0.484) (0.977) (1.000) (0.259) (0.601) (0.995) (1.000) (1.000) (0.258)
Wald 8.128 137.4*** 93.37*** 29.98*** 3.521 65.19*** 78.10*** 23.66*** --- 3.609 85.49***
(0.149) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.317) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.164) (0.000)
Countries 12 22 23 11 5 30 21 13 9 5 34
Obser 64 111 122 53 27 155 104 71 49 25 175
***,**,*: significance levels of 1%,  5% and 10% respectively. English: Common-Law. French: Civil-Law. Christ: Christians. N.Africa: North 
Africa. SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa. Low I: Low Income. Middle I: Middle Income. LMI: Lower Middle Income. UMI: Upper Middle Income. 2 nd 
Auto: Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying Restrictions test. Obser: Observations. PubIvt: Public Investment. Popg: Population 
growth. Wald: Statistics for joint significance of estimated coefficients.  
We  first   notice  that(with  the  exception  of  the  African  panel  in  the  GDP  per  capita 
regressions) in all models the instruments are valid as the alternative hypotheses of the AR(2) and 
Sargan-OIR tests are rejected.  Also in almost all cases where the lagged endogenous estimated 
coefficient  is  significant,  the  Wald  statistics  is  also  significant:  exceptions  to  this  are  North 
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African(English common-law and Upper  Middle Income)  countries   in GDP per  capita(human 
development)  regressions. In the case of GDP per capita we find CC only in French civil  law 
countries with a convergence rate of  5.75% p.a and the time required for a 100% convergence of 
69.56 years. Conversely, but for the cases of North Africa and Lower Middle Income countries, we 
find overwhelming evidence of CC in human development: the following are their convergence 
rates and time required for 100% convergence: English common-law(13.92% p.a for 28.73yrs); 
French civil-law(19.77% p.a for 20.23yrs), Christian(16.17% p.a for 24.73 yrs); Islam(23.70% p.a 
for  16.87yrs);  SSA(17.12% p.a  for  23.36yrs);  Low income (20.42% p.a  for  19.58yrs);  Middle 
income(12.50% p.a for 32yrs); Upper middle income(8.82% p.a for 45.35yrs) and Africa(15.00% 
p.a  for 26.66yrs).
4. 4 Discussion, policy implications and future directions  
Before delving into discussions of the findings, it is imperative to reconcile our results with 
economic growth theories. The findings have broadly rejected the neoclassical(exogenous) growth 
model prediction  that real per capita income converges to each country’s steady state or common 
steady  state  regardless  of  its  initial  level.  Thus  confirming  the  endogenous  theory  which 
emphasizes  that  differences  among countries  in  their  initial  endowments  and the possibility  of 
multiple equilibria shows that there is no tendency for income levels to converge in the long run.  
Conversely, results for  human development are in line with the neoclassical growth hypothesis and 
run  counter  to  the  endogenous  theory.   Therefore  from  a  theoretical  standpoint,  it  could  be 
concluded that while GDP per capita(human development) findings, reject(confirm) the exogenous 
growth model theory, human development(GDP per capita) results reject(confirm) the endogenous 
theory. Put in plainer terms, findings reveal while  human development supports the exogenous 
growth model and rejects the endogenous theory, its income component suggests the contrary
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4.4.1 Absolute Convergence(AC)
Absolute convergence is the result from factors such as monetary unions and the adoption 
of a single currency , among others(Nayaran et al., 2011). In the context of our paper it stretches 
beyond  monetary  policies  to  include  homogenous  characteristics  of  human  development  like 
religions, income-levels, regions, institutional qualities, legal origins…etc. Therefore  AC implies 
that countries share the same fundamental characteristics with respect to development, such that the 
only difference between countries is in the initial level of development. The absence of  AC in per 
capita  income suggests that,   holding other things constant(such as political  instability,  market 
isolation and macroeconomic conditions) financial liberalization has not: reduced barriers to trade, 
increased  investment,  mitigated  capital  controls  and  stifled  the  control  on  exchange  rate 
transactions. Openness(globalization) in trade and capital has not had some positive redistributive 
impact  on income between rich  and poor  African  countries.  Simply  put,  structural  adjustment 
programs  implemented  by African  countries  may  not  have  had  the  desired  absolute  effect  on 
equalizing per capita income growth. If we were to assume that cross border capital flows have 
increased with financial liberalization, then the cross-country income equalizing impact has been 
negative. Recent inequality-growth literature point to the negative income redistributive impact of 
foreign direct investment in the African continent(Asongu,2011ab). This interpretation should be 
treated with caution because a great chunk of foreign private capital  flows often emanate from 
developed countries and not from other African countries within the same panel.  All these factors 
have resulted in the absence of absolute convergence in per capita income. 
Conversely,  AC  in  human  development  has  converged  because  of  increase  in  life 
expectancy, literacy and gross enrolment ratios due to development policies by the United Nations 
Development Program, World Bank, World Health Organization, World Trade Organization , Food 
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and  Agricultural  Organization…etc.  Therefore  it  maybe  said  that  irrespective  of  cross-country 
differences  in  structural  and institutional  characteristics,  the impact  of  policies  by multilateral 
donor organizations  is  equalizing in human development. Put in contextual terms, fundamental 
characteristics from multilateral donor agencies are the same within countries of the same panel. In 
spite  of  dissimilar  initial  conditions  of  human  development  across  countries,  global  human 
development  initiatives  are  being  applied  in  all  countries  without  distinction:  leading  to  poor 
countries catching-up with their rich neighbors. 
4.4.2 Conditional Convergence(CC) 
Borrowing from Barro(1991), in the  economic growth literature conditional convergence 
depicts convergence whereby one’s own long-term steady state(equilibrium) is contingent on the 
different  structural  characteristics  or  fundamentals  of  each  economy  or  market(Nayaran  et 
al.,2011).  When countries  with the same fundamental  characteristics(  in the same homogenous 
panel) differ in terms of factors relating to the performance of their economies, there is likely to be 
conditional convergence. This convergence is contingent on the variables we select and empirically 
test;  implying  findings  depend  on  macro  economic  variables  used.  With  constraints  in  data 
availability and degrees of freedom required for the OIR test, we conditioned the analysis on four 
macroeconomic variables(openness, inflation, population growth and public investment): consistent 
with the convergence literature(Prichett,  1997;  Bruno et  al.,  2011; Narayan et  al.,  2011).  Thus 
based on our conditioning information set it could be established that, differences in factors related 
to  social  and  health  performance  across  countries  are  blurring;  thus  leading  to  conditional 
convergence in human development. It follows that countries with lower living standards in terms 
of life  expectancy,  literacy  and  gross  enrolment  ratios  are  catching-up  with  their  higher-level 
counterparts. Conversely, we fail to find any backing in per capita income CC. This absence could 
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result  from  persisting  cross-country  differences  in  long  run  economic  performance  patterns. 
Population growth, inflation, globalization(openness) and public investment on which the analysis 
is conditioned are crucial determinants of GDP per capita growth. Beyond structural disparities, 
cross-country  differences  in  government  quality  determinants  like  control  of  corruption, 
government effectiveness, regulation quality,  rule of law and political  instability also constitute 
important  institutional patterns that could explain this absence in convergence. 
4.4.3 Retrospect to testable hypotheses 
In the introduction of this paper, we highlighted certain concerns common to all panels that 
cut deep into the formulation of theories and policies of economic growth in the African continent. 
For clarity in interpretation of results we reformulate the issues.
a)  Is human development among African countries converging or diverging?  Based on distinct 
homogenous settings, while human development in per capita income terms is not significantly 
converging, non-income aspects of human development like health care, education, life expectancy 
and gross enrolment ratios are converging.
b) Do income levels matter in poor countries catching-up with their rich counterparts? In terms of 
both AC and CC, income levels matter in convergence, with low income panels experiencing a 
higher  rate  of  convergence  than  their  middle  income counter  parts.  This  fact  still  holds  when 
convergence dynamics of upper and lower middle income countries are compared.
c)  Do religious-domination,  legal  origin and regional-belonging have some bearing on human  
development convergence(divergence) in Africa? Islam(French civil-law) dominated countries have 
a higher rate of convergence in human development  than their  Christian(English common-law) 
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counterparts. In absolute human development terms, convergence is higher in North Africa than in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. 
4.4.4 Contribution to addressing exiting puzzle in the literature
Our findings have partially confirmed  the Sutcliffe(2004) hypothesis on the validity of the 
HDI convergence(as preached by the IMF). Konya & Guisan(2008) concurred with the criticism by 
Sutcliffe(2004)  only with respect to the income dimension of the HDI and went forth to use the 
HDI  in  its  integrality.  By  distinguishing  the  income  effect  from the  integral  HDI  effect,  our 
findings  have  confirmed  the  Konya  &  Guisan(2008)  criticism  on  this  partial  validity  of  the 
Sutcliffe(2004)  hypothesis.  It  follows  that  with  respect  to  various  homogenous  strands  in  the 
African continent while the HDI converges, its income component doesn’t. 
4.4.5  Policy implications: beyond income convergence
The  debate  on  convergence  has  tended  to  be  linked  with  a  radical  defense  of  the 
neoclassical  growth  model.  Proponents  supporting  this  thesis  have  mostly  focused  on  income 
convergence. However there is need to focus beyond income convergence and objectively assess 
other components beside income that can wheel the transitions that are essential in the development 
process. The convergence decomposition must extend well beyond GDP growth mechanisms. Our 
analysis shows that different human development variables like life expectancy and literacy levels 
have been converging in the African continent. The weak case for income convergence( in support 
of  the  endogenous  growth  model)  in  our  findings  suggests  in  substance  that  convergence  in 
institutional  factors  affecting,  life-expectancy,  literacy  and  democracy  are  also  crucial  in  the 
formulation and implementation of policies aimed at reducing cross-country human development 
variations. A corollary of above explanation is that certain  human development variables  naturally 
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converge and do not require much policy intervention. At this point in time, it could be established 
that  the income component  of the human development  index moves  slower than others  in  the 
convergence process and thus requires a more focused policy intervention.  
4.4.6  Future directions
Given significant convergence findings in human development across homogenous strands 
in the African continent,  future research aimed at  further elucidating this  human development-
convergence  nexus  could  be  directed  at  assessing  which  variables  have  most  intervened  in 
improving  human  development.  In  other  words,  what  roles  have  income  improvement,  life 
expectancy,  literacy  and  gross  enrolment  ratios  played  in  human  development-convergence? 
Mayer-Foulkes(2010) has documented an analysis  of this kind with a broad and global appeal, 
however a replicate for the African continent could result in interesting policy implications.
5. Summary 
In examining some big questions on African development, we have provided evidence that 
dynamics of some development indicators could support both endogenous and neoclassical growth 
theories in the convergence debate. This paper has  investigated convergence in real per capita 
GDP and  inequality  adjusted  human  development  in  African  countries,  disaggregated  into  11 
homogenous panels based on regions(Sub-Saharan and North Africa), income-levels(low, middle, 
lower-middle  and  upper-middle),  legal-origins(English  common-law and  French  civil-law)  and 
religious  dominations(Christianity  and  Islam).  Findings  suggest,  while   human  development 
supports the exogenous growth model and rejects the endogenous theory, its income component 
suggests the contrary. As a policy implication, looking beyond income convergence can provide a 
concrete agenda for development involving all aspects of economic, institutional and social life. 
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Also the income component of the human development index moves slower than others in the 
convergence process and thus requires a more focused policy intervention.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Summary statistics
Mean S.D Minimum Maximum Observations
Development GDP pc growth 1.071 7.447 -30.430 90.140 292
Human development 1.763 7.590 0.163 47.475 297
Control 
Variables 
Openness(Trade) 65.889 34.606 10.079 192.29 285
Inflation 22.145 123.54 -100.00 1986.9 281
Public Investment 7.527 4.393 0.000 27.523 248
Population growth rate 2.539 1.236 -8.271 8.314 304
S.D: Standard D. GDPpc : Gross Domestic Product per capita. 
Appendix  2: Correlation analysis
GDP pcg Human Dev. Openness Inflation P. Investment Pop. growth
1.000 -0.020 0.118 -0.256 0.149 0.291 GDP pcg
1.000 -0.067 -0.011 -0.137 -0.007 Human Dev.
1.000 -0.122 0.272 -0.191 Openness
1.000 -0.162 0.079 Inflation
1.000 -0.057 P. Investment
1.000 Pop. growth
GDPpcg : GDP per capita growth rate. Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index. P: Public. Pop: Population. Dev: 
Development. 
Appendix 3: Variable definitions
Variables Sign Variable Definitions Sources
Inflation Infl. Consumer Prices (Annual %) World Bank(WDI)
Openness Trade Imports(of goods and services) plus 
Exports(of goods and services) on GDP
World Bank(WDI)
Public  Investment PubI Gross Public Investment(% of GDP) World Bank(WDI)
Population growth Popg Average annual Population  growth rate World Bank(WDI)
Human Development HD Inequality Adjusted Human Development World Bank(WDI)
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Appendix 4: Presentation of countries
Group Group  category Countries Num
Legal origin
English Common-Law Botswana,  The  Gambia,  Ghana,  Kenya,  Lesotho,  Liberia, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, 
Swaziland,  Uganda, Zambia, Tanzania.
16
French Civil-Law Algeria,  Benin,  Burkina  Faso,  Burundi,  Cameroon,  Central 
African Republic, Chad, Ivory Coast, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial 
Guinea,  Ethiopia,  Gabon, Madagascar,   Mali, Morocco, Niger, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia, Libya
22
Religions 
Christianity 
Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Ivory Coast, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, 
Lesotho,  Liberia,  Madagascar,  Malawi,  Mauritius,  Rwanda, 
South Africa, Swaziland, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Tanzania.
23
Islam 
Algeria,  Burkina  Faso,  Chad,  Djibouti,  Egypt,  The  Gambia, 
Mali,  Morocco,  Niger,  Nigeria,  Senegal,  Sierra  Leone,  Sudan, 
Tunisia, Libya.
15
Regions 
Sub-Saharan Africa
Benin,  Botswana,  Djibouti,  The  Gambia,  Ghana,  Kenya, 
Lesotho,  Liberia,  Malawi,  Mauritius,  Nigeria,  Sierra  Leone, 
South  Africa,  Sudan,  Swaziland,   Uganda,  Zambia,  Tanzania, 
Burkina  Faso,  Burundi,  Cameroon,  Central  African  Republic, 
Chad,  Ivory  Coast,   Equatorial  Guinea,  Ethiopia,  Gabon, 
Madagascar,  Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Togo.
33
North Africa Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya. 5
Income 
Levels
Low Income 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Djibouti,  Ethiopia,  The  Gambia,  Ghana,  Kenya,  Liberia, 
Madagascar,  Malawi,   Mali,  Niger,  Rwanda,   Sierra  Leone, 
Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Tanzania. 
21
Middle Income
Algeria  ,Botswana,  Cameroon,  Ivory  Coast,  Egypt,  Equatorial 
Guinea, Gabon, Lesotho, Mauritius, Morocco,  Nigeria, Senegal, 
South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tunisia, Libya.
17
Lower Middle Income Cameroon,   Ivory  Coast,  Egypt,  Lesotho,  Morocco,  Nigeria, 
Senegal, Sudan, Swaziland, Tunisia.
10
Upper Middle Income Algeria, Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Mauritius, South 
Africa, Libya.
7
Num: Number of cross sections(countries)
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